We consider a DSGE model with monopolistic competitive banks together with endogenous …rms entry. We …nd that our model implies higher volatilities of both real and …nancial variables than those implied by a DSGE model with monopolistic banking sector and a …xed number of …rms. The response of the economic activity is also more persistent in response to all shocks. Furthermore, we show that ine¢cient banks enhance the endogenous propagation of the shocks in respect to a model where banks compete under perfect competition and can fully ensure against the risk of …rms default.
Introduction
An important link between the …nancial market and the real economy is created by …rms that …nance their activity by borrowing from banks. Studying this link helps to understand one of the most important transmission channel of the …nancial market to the real economy. Further, as shown in the recent …nancial crisis, the interaction between the banking sector and the good market sector, may a¤ect not only the intensive margin of the good market but also its extensive margin, that is …rm entry and exit decisions. Following these insights, this paper investigates the relationship between …rms dynamics and banking, in a DSGE model characterized by ‡exible prices, monopolistic competitive banking and sticky interest rates, together with endogenous …rms' entry decisions, modelled as in Bilbiie Ghironi and Melitz (2012 -BGM henceforth) . Using this framework, we seek to understand the transmission channel of real and …nancial shocks to the real economic activity, disentangling the role played by endogenous …rms creation from that played by monopolistic banks. With respect to the latter, we assume that banks cannot ensure against the risk of …rms default. This implies that banks can incur in balance sheet losses. We contribute to the literature by …nding the following main results. First, in response to both real and …nancial shocks, a model with endogenous …rms creation and ine¢cient banks implies a stronger ampli…cation of the business cycle and higher volatilities of both real and …nancial variables than those implied by a DSGE model with monopolistic banking and a …xed number of …rms. Second, response of the economic activity is also more persistent in response to all shocks. Third, we show that the presence of ine¢cient banks enhance the endogenous propagation of the shocks in respect to a model where the banking sector is e¢cient. Finally, to assess the robustness of our results we consider two di¤erent ways of measuring …rms sunk entry cost. We show that the main results remain unchanged.
Our paper is motivated by two main empirical facts. First, the big role played by the banking sector in the recent …nancial crisis both the US and in Europe. Adrian, Colla and Shin (2012) for example have shown that depletion of bank capital from sub-prime losses has forced banks to reduce lending and to raise to costs of credit. Similarly, Neri (2012) shows the EU GDP contraction started in 2008 was almost entirely due to shocks to the banking sector. Second, the strong contraction of the GDP has been accompanied by a strong credit crunch and a reduction in …rms entry as well as an increase in exit, which also contributed to deteriorate the quality of the banks balance sheets.
So far, theoretical DSGE models used for business cycle analysis do not investigate the interaction between …rms dynamics and banking. Recently, BGM (2012) consider a model with endogenous …rms entry and show that the sluggish response of the number of producers (due to the sunk entry costs) generates a new and potentially important endogenous propagation mechanism for real business cycle models. Etro and Colciago (2010) characterize endogenous good market structure under Bertrand and Cournot competition in a DSGE model and show that their model improves the ability of a ‡exible price model in matching impulse response functions and second moments for US data. Col-ciago and Rossi (2012) extend this model accounting for search and matching frictions in the labor market. Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Cavallari (2013) analyze the role of entry in an open economy framework. Nevertheless, all these models embed a perfect …nancial market. At the same time DSGE models embedding …nancial market frictions as for example Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) , do not consider the direct central bank intermediation as an instrument of monetary policy. An exception are Moore (2009), Curdia and Woodford (2009) and more recently, Karadi (2011), Gerali et al. (2010) and De Walque (2011), among others. All these models however, consider a constant number of …rms and do not investigate the role played by the interaction between …rms dynamics and banking. Thus, to the best of our knowledge we are the …rst to introduce a structured banking sector in a DSGE model characterized by endogenous …rms entry decision. Overall, we show that theoretical models cannot disregard the role played by endogenous market structure since they would underestimate the e¤ects of both real and …nancial shocks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model economy. Section 3 contains the main results. Section 4 presents some robustness and Section 5 concludes. Technical details are left in the supplemental Appendix available online.
2 The model
Firms
The supply side of the economy is composed by an intermediate good-producing sector and a retail sector that aggregates the intermediate goods. The latter operates under perfect competition, while the former under monopolistic competition.
Firms: the intermediate sector
We assume a continuum of …rms producing a di¤erentiated intermediate goods i 2 N; so that N represents both the mass of available goods and the number of …rms. P I i;t being the nominal price of good i. The intermediate good is sold under fully ‡exible prices to the retail sector. The production function of …rm i is y
where l i;t is the amount of labor hours employed by …rm i, and A t is the aggregate productivity, such that
where " A;t is a standard white noise with zero mean and a standard deviation
Real pro…ts of the intermediate goods …rm, are given by:
Here we follow Ravenna and Walsh (2006) setup and we assume that at the beginning of period t …rm i …nances its working capital by using bank loans. This implies that …rm's loan in real terms is b i:t = w t l i;t (with w t = Wt Pt ): The loan is paid back to the bank at the end of the same period.
The intermediate goods …rm chooses the amount of labor and the optimal price in order to maximize expected real pro…ts, subject to y
which is the demand for the intermediate good i, with P t being the CPI index. First order conditions yield the optimal demand for labor and the optimal price, being respectively:
where mc i;t are …rm i real marginal costs and 
Endogenous Entry
As in BGM (2012), prior to entry …rms are identical and face a …xed sunk entry cost f E . At the beginning of each period N E t new …rms enter in the economy. Prospective entrants in period t compute their expected value as the present discounted value of their expected pro…ts.
Then, entry occurs until the …rm value is equalized with the …xed entry cost, f E , leading to the following …rm entry condition
Entrants at time t 1 will only start producing at time t, so that a one-period time-to-build lag is introduced in the model. After production has occurred, as in BGM (2012) a constant fraction of …rms exit from the market. Thus, the law of motion of number of …rms in the economy at period t is:
where is the exogenous probability of exiting the market. 
at the price level
As in BGM (2012), the price level of the retail …rm can be rewritten as:
The aggregate output is:
where we de…ne t = N 1 1 t and L t = N t l t is the aggregate amount of labor hours.
Households
Households maximize their expected utility which depends on consumption and labor hours as follows
where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, the variable L t represents hours worked, while C t is the consumption index for a set of goods bundled by the retail sector as follows:
The parameter and > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in each sector. Households consume and work. They also decide how much to invest in new …rms and in the shares of incumbent …rms and how much to lend to the banking sector. The households budget constraint in nominal terms is
According to BGM (2012), we denote with t the share in a mutual fund of …rms held by the representative household. During period t, the representative household buys t+1 shares in a mutual fund of N H;t …rms, where N H;t = N t + N E t represents …rms already operating at time t and the new entrants. The mutual fund pays N t j I t pro…ts in each period, which is equal to the total pro…t of all …rms that produce in that period. The main di¤erence between new and old …rms is that establishing a new …rm requires an entry cost while the shares of an old …rm are traded on the stock market. Households' resources are composed by wage earnings (W t L t ), net interest income on previous deposits (r d t D t ), the value of the shares of …rms they own (N t t v t ) and …rms' dividends from …rms survived from the previous period (N t t j I t ) in the same sector. The ‡ow of expenses includes consumption (C t ), deposits made at the end of the period (D t ) and …nancial investments in …rms already operating in the market and in new …rms (N H;t t+1 v t ).
Combining households FOCs and considering that in equilibrium t = t+1 = 1, we get
which respectively are the households' labor supply, the Euler equation for consumption and the Euler equation for share holding.
Banking Sector 2.3.1 Loans and Deposits Demand
The structure of the banking sector follows Gerali et al. (2010) . We assume that deposits from households and loans to entrepreneurs are a composite CES basket of slightly di¤erentiated products, each supplied by a single bank with elasticities of substitution equal to " b t and " d respectively. More in detail we assume that the retail branch of banks are monopolistic competitive, so that they enjoy market power in setting interest rates on deposits and loans.
3 As in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework, loans and deposits demands are respectively:
where b j;t is the aggregate demand for loans at bank j; that is b j;t = R i2N b i;j;t di, and b t is the overall volume of loans to …rms. Then d j;t is the households aggregate demand for deposits to bank j; while d t is the households overall demand for deposits.
Further, following Gerali et al. (2010) and in line with Smets and Wouters (2003) , we assume that the elasticities of substitution in the loan branch follow an AR(1) stochastic process.
where u b t is normally distributed white noises with zero mean and variance 
Wholesale and Retail
The …nancial agents are banks, which are divided in three branches: the wholesale branch and the retail branches for loans and deposits. At the wholesale level they operate in perfect competition, while as mentioned above, at the retail level they operate in a regime of monopolistic competition.
The amount of loans issued by each bank can be …nanced through the amount of deposits collected from households, and through bank capital (bank net worth), which is accumulated out of retained earnings. Banks play a key role in determining the conditions of credit supply. Assuming monopolistic competition between banks, we allow retail banks to have a certain degree of market power in setting or adjusting interest rates on deposits and loans in response to shocks.
Wholesale banks have to obey a balance sheet constraint,
We assume that the wholesale branch issues loans (B t ) to the loans branch of the retail banks by using both deposits collected by deposit branch of the retail banks from households (D t ) and bank capital (K b t ). All variables are expressed in real terms.
where b represents resources used in managing bank capital, j b t are overall pro…ts made by the retail branches of the bank, and " k t represents a bank capital shock following an AR(1) process:
where u k t is normally distributed white noises with zero mean and variance
Wholesale Branch The wholesale branch operates in a competitive way and combines bank capital and deposits to issue wholesale loans. Through the balance sheet constraint it manages the capital position of the bank. The problem for the wholesale branch is thus to choose the amount of loans and deposits to maximize the discounted sum of real cash ‡ows, subject to the balance sheet constraint. Further, as in Gerali et al (2010) we assume that the bank faces quadratic adjustment costs in changing the capital to asset ratio
Bt , given by
where b is the steady state value of the capital to asset ratio. After some algebra the problem can be reduced to:
The …rst order condition of the wholesale bank relates the spread between wholesale loans and deposits rates to the bank leverage
The deposit rate is pinned down in the interbank market and it is equal to the policy rate (R d t = r t ).
Notice that, when
Bt decreases relatively to the steady state value (and in turn leverage Bt K b t increases), the di¤erence between R b t and r t increases and margins become wider. In this case, as R b t increases, banks increase loan supply because of the greater interest rate on wholesale loans, and thus they increase their pro…ts. But on the other hand, as leverage b becomes more costly, reducing bank pro…ts. So banks face two di¤erent forces which push them in opposite directions. In this case, the result given by the …rst order condition suggests the optimal choice for banks: banks have to choose a level of loans (and thus of leverage, given a level of K b t ) that keeps the marginal cost of reducing the capital-to-assets ratio equal to the spread between loans and deposits.
Retail Branches (Loans and Deposits)
Retail banks compete under monopolistic competition with other banks. As in Gerali et al. (2010) , we use a standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator for loans and deposits. This implies that all banks essentially serve all …rms, providing slightly di¤erentiated loan contracts. Similarly, banks o¤er di¤erentiated deposits to the household. Both loans and deposits of banks are indexed to a continuum interval (j = 0; 1). Imperfect substitutability between the contracts of di¤erent banks will additionally lead to explicit monopolistic mark-ups and mark-downs on these rates.
The loan branch can borrow from the wholesale unit at a rate R b t , it di¤er-entiates the loans at no cost and resells them to the …rms applying a markup. Each retail bank faces a quadratic adjustment cost for changing the loan rates. This cost introduces sticky bank rates in the model.
We assume that banks do not observe the borrower's …nancial situation, they only observe if the borrower repays the loan. So that banks pro…ts maximization problem is: 
9 which under ‡exible rates it becomes,
Notice that, the newness with respect to Gerali et al. (2010) is that, …rms exit probability a¤ects the value of the mark-up in the steady state and also the dynamics of r b t under sticky banks rate. Indeed, as the probability of exit increases, retail banks set higher interest rate. The intuition is straightforward. An higher probability of exit increases the probability of a …rm of not repaying the loan, bank that issued that loan faces lower pro…ts and is forced to increase the interest rates.
The retail deposit branch collects deposits from households and gives them to the wholesale unit. The wholesale unit pays them at rate r t , which is the same rate at which wholesale unit have access to the funds of the Central Bank. The problem for the deposit branch is ; and thus d j;t = d t and D j;t = D t ; we get the optimal interest rate for deposits,
under ‡exible rates the equation becomes,
the interest rate on deposits is mark-down over the policy rate r t .
Bank Pro…ts
Bank pro…ts are also a¤ected by the probability of exit, since they are the sum of the pro…ts of the wholesale and the retail sector. Bank pro…ts now become:
where
(35) indicates adjustment costs for changing interest rates on loans and deposits and changes in capital-to-asset ratio.
Monetary Policy
To close the model we need to specify an equation for the Central Bank behavior, i.e. we need to introduce an equation for the nominal interest rate r t prevailing in the interbank market. In this respect we assume that the monetary authority simply follows a standard Taylor rule given by
Business Cycle Analysis
In what follows we will study the impulse response functions to a productivity shock, to a shock to the bank capital and to a shock to the bank markup. In order to investigate the role played by the endogenous …rms creation, we compare the dynamics of our baseline model with endogenous entry and monopolistic banks (labelled as EEM model) with that of a standard DSGE model with a …xed number of …rms and monopolistic banks, that we label as Constant Firms model. Finally, in the second part of the business cycle analysis, to disentangle the contribution of …rms creation in respect to that of ine¢cient banks, we compare the performance of these two models we the performance of two alternative models: i) the EEM model with ‡exible banks rates, which allow to capture the role of sticky banks rates; ii) a model with endogenous entry and e¢cient banks. The banking sector is e¢cient since banks compete under perfect competition and can fully ensure against the risk of incurring in bank capital losses due to …rms default. The comparison with this model will help to understand the importance of …rms default in the banking problem and consequently in the model dynamics.
Calibration
Calibration is set on a quarterly basis. The elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods, ; is set equal to 4, a value which is in line to that of BGM (2012). Analogously, as in BGM (2012), we set the inverse of Frisch = 2, the entry cost f E = 1 and we set the size of the exogenous exit shock to be 0:025, to match the U.S. empirical level of 10% of …rms destruction per year. The steady state of productivity A = 1.
We calibrate the banking parameters " b = 3:12 and " d = 1:5 as in Gerali et al. (2010) so as to replicate their markup, we calibrate the discount factor to 0:9943 and the steady state value of the capital-to-asset ratio b is 0:09. Adjustments costs in the banking sector are taken from the prior values set in Gerali et al. (2010) , which are b = 9:51, d = 3:63, K B = 11:49. For the Taylor rule parameters, we set R = 0:8, = 1:75 and y = 0:125, which guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium and are in the range of the parameters usually estimated for both US and EU.
6 Persistence of shocks are set at 0:9 while standard deviations are at 0:01.
Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1-3 show the impulse response functions (IRFs) to a positive technology shock, a negative shock to bank capital, and to a shock to bank markup. In all …gures, the dashed-dotted line represents the Constant Firms model 7 whereas the solid line represents the baseline EEM model.
Technology shock
As shown in Figure 1 , the economy characterized by endogenous …rms dynamics (i.e. EEM model henceforth) shows higher volatilities of output, in ‡ation, interest rates and loans, than those implied by a standard model with a constant number of …rms. A positive technology shock creates expectations of higher future pro…ts which lead to the entry of new …rms. Given that entry is subject to a one period time-to-build lag the total number of …rms, N t , does not change on impact, but builds up gradually.
The entry margin leads to a much stronger and more persistent increase in output and to a higher and more persistent increase in the demand for loans. Since the banking sector is imperfectly competitive, interest rates on loans are related to the policy rate. The decline in the policy rate leads to a decline in the interest rate on loans, leading in turn to a wider access to credit for …rms, and thus implying an increase in the number of …rms asking for loans. Lower interest rates on loans has two e¤ects: lower loan rates, ceteris paribus, imply higher …rms pro…ts and thus higher entry, which gives an additional boost to output. After the initial increase of loans, due to the more favorable credit access, lower interest rates generate lower bank pro…ts and lower bank capital and an higher bank leverage ratio. After some periods, higher leverage costs force banks to reduce loans, reduce credit access, so that the number of …rms asking for loans decreases and, consequently, all variables turn back to their steady state values. 
Bank Capital Shock
In Figure 2 we present the IRFs to a negative shock to the bank capital. As before, the economy characterized by endogenous …rms dynamics shows higher volatilities of output, in ‡ation, interest rates and loans, than those implied by a standard model with a constant number of …rms. Notice that, since bank capital contraction decreases banks' pro…ts, banks are forced to increase interest rates on loans and, as a result, …rms marginal costs and pro…ts increase. Given the expectations of lower pro…ts new entrants decrease, so that the total amount of …rms and loans decrease. The persistent increase in the interest rate on loans drags real activity down. The higher …nancing costs push in ‡ation up. 
Bank Markup Shock
We now show the IRFs to a negative shock to bank markup, obtained through a positive shock to the interest rate elasticity of loans. Figure 3 compares the IRFs of the model with endogenous entry with those of the model with a constant number of …rms. The increase in the substitutability between loans leads to an increase in the competition between banks, which implies lower banks markups and thus pro…ts, and a decrease in bank capital. Incumbent …rms face more convenient credit conditions which lead to an increase in …rms new entrants. As in ‡ation decreases, policy rate decrease, then lower interest rates on loans lead to a decrease in the interest rate spread and to an increase in the demand for loans. 
The role of banking sector and its interaction with …rms dynamics
In order to evaluate the role of the banking sector in the interaction with …rms dynamics, we now compare the IRFs to a technology shock in our baseline model (now labelled EEM sticky rates, solid lines) and the model with a constant number of …rms (labelled as Constant Firms, thin solid lines), with two alternative versions of the baseline model: i) the EEM model with ‡exible bank rates (labelled EEM ‡ex rates, dotted lines), which allow us to capture the role of sticky banks rates; ii) a model with endogenous entry and e¢cient banks (labelled EEM E¢cient Banks, dashed-dotted lines). In this model, banks are e¢cient for two reasons: …rst they compete under perfect competition, so that there is only one interest rate in the economy coinciding with the policy rate. Second, banks can fully insure against the risk of incurring in balance sheet losses in the presence of …rms default. This means that bank losses and thus …rms default probability are not taken into account in the optimization problem of the loan branch. As a consequence the optimal interest rate on loans does not depend on . Figure 4 shows the dynamics of the main variables under the four models, in response to a 1 percent increase in productivity. Notice that, the two models with endogenous entry and ine¢cient banks, show greater volatility for both real and …nancial variables, in respect to the model with e¢cient banks. The presence of ine¢cient banks implies a stronger and more persistent response of the loan rate. Indeed, since real marginal costs are directly a¤ected by the loan rate, the models with entry and ine¢cient banks imply also a stronger reaction of the in ‡ation rate. Further, the huge drop in the loan interest rate is followed by an higher increase in the amount of loans to …rms, which enhances the endogenous propagation of the shocks. The latter e¤ect is larger in the economy with ‡exible bank interest rates. Finally notice that the model with e¢cient banks implies a stronger response of output than a model with a constant number of …rms, thus emphasizing the big role played by endogenous entry.
Overall the main message coming from the comparison across these four models can be summarized as followed: i) the extensive margin has an important propagating e¤ect of real and …nancial shocks, in line with the literature on …rms dynamics; ii) the interaction between the extensive margin and the …nan-cial markets enhances the endogenous propagation of the shocks. iii) The propagation is even stronger in economies where banks cannot fully ensure against the risk of …rms default. We see this result as a contribution in the literature, suggesting to further investigate the role of …nancial markets and their interaction with …rms dynamics. 
Robustness

Considering Di¤erent Entry Costs
This section contains a robustness exercise in which we examine the e¤ect of having a di¤erent entry costs. In particular, we consider a non-constant entry cost de…ned in terms of labor units, modelled as in BGM (2012). We show impulse response functions to the three shocks considered so far.
To introduce an entry cost de…ned in labor units we de…ne total labor as
, where L C t is the amount of labor used to produce consumption goods, whereas L 
the rest of the model remains unchanged.
Impulse Response Functions
In what follows we study the IRFs to a total factor productivity shock, to a bank capital shock and to a shock to bank markup. We compare the performance of the two models: i) the baseline EEM with a constant cost of entry, and ii) the EEM with an entry cost measured in labor units. In all …gures, the solid line represents the model with constant cost of entry (labelled as CC), whereas the dotted line represents the model with entry cost in labor units (labelled as LU). Figure 5 shows the IRFs to a positive technology shock. As shown in the Figure the exogenous exit model with a constant entry shows a higher volatility in respect to the model with the entry cost in labor units. This is not surprising since an increase in productivity directly decreases the cost of entry. Despite this, the two models show very similar dynamics, but for the hours used to produce consumption goods: the LU model is characterized by a decrease on impact of hours used in the good-producing sector (labelled as Lc in the subplot of the …gure). Labor used to produce new …rms (labelled as Le) strongly increases so that total hours worked (labelled as L) increase also in the LU economy. Figure 6 presents the IRFs to a negative shock to bank capital. As before the LU model show a countercyclical response on impact of hours used to produce consumption goods and, consequently, an increase on impact of output instead of a decrease. However, after the …rst period also the LU economy enters into a downturn. Figure 7 presents the IRFs to a negative shock to bank markup. For the LU model IRFs show a decrease in output on impact and a countercyclical response of hours in the good-producing sector and also of output which decreases on impact instead of increasing. However, from the …rst period on also the LU economy enters into a boom. A second robustness check, not reported in the paper, has been done by introducing sticky prices à la Rotemberg (1982) , in the intermediate good sector. We …nd the main results and thus the message of the paper unchanged. 
Conclusion
We consider a DSGE model with ‡exible prices, monopolistic competitive banking sector and sticky interest rates together with endogenous …rms' dynamics. We show that in response to both real and …nancial shocks, economies characterized by endogenous …rms dynamics imply higher volatilities of both real and …nancial variables than those implied by a DSGE model with monopolistic banking sector and a …xed number of …rms. The response of the economic activity is also more persistent in response to all shocks. Moreover, we …nd that the presence of monopolistic competition in the banking sector, together with the assumption that banks cannot fully ensure against the risk of …rms default, enhance the endogenous propagation of the shocks. We show that our result are robust to the introduction of alternative entry costs. Overall, we believe
